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THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UGANDA AT KAMPALA

*[CORAM: KATUREEBE; TUMWESIGYE; KISAAYE; JJSC,
ODOKI; TSEKOOKO; OKELLO; KITUMBA; AG. JJSC]*

CONSTITUTIONAL APPEAL NO 01 OF 2013

BETWEEN

**1. CENTRE FOR HEALTH, HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT
(CEHURD)**

2. PROF. BEN TWINOMUGISHA

3. RHODA KUKKIRIZA

4. INZIKU VALENTE] APPELLANTS

AND

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL.....] RESPONDENT

*[Appeal from the Ruling of Justices of the Constitutional Court (Mpigi – Bahigeine, DCJ,
Byamugisha, Kavuma, Nshimye, Kasule, JJA) dated 5th June, 2012 in Constitutional Petition No.
16 of 2011*

JUDGMENT OF DR. KISAAYE, JSC

This appeal arises from the Ruling of the Constitutional Court rendered in
Constitutional Petition No. 16 of 2011 in which the appellants had
challenged certain actions and omissions of the Government and its staff in
providing maternal health services in Government hospitals/health facilities.
The Constitutional Court struck out the appellants' Petition without hearing
its merits, on two grounds, the first being that the Petition did not disclose
competent questions that required interpretation of the Constitution.

Secondly, the Constitutional Court struck out the Petition on grounds that the Court could not look into the acts and omissions the Petitioners were complaining of because of the Political Question doctrine.

5 Background to the appeal

The background to this appeal is that the appellants filed Constitutional Petition No. 16 of 2011 under **Articles 137(3), (4) and 45** of the Constitution of Uganda, 1995 and Rule 3 of the Constitutional Court (Petitions and References) Rules, (SI No.91 of 2005). In this Petition, the appellants
10 challenged certain actions and omissions of the Government and its workers in providing maternal health services, which included, among others, the non-provision of basic indispensable maternal health commodities in Government health facilities; the inadequate number of midwives and doctors to provide maternal health services; the inadequate budget allocation to the
15 maternal health sector and the imprudent unethical behaviour of health workers toward expectant mothers which, had resulted in the death of some women during childbirth.

The Petitioners alleged that these actions and omissions were inconsistent
20 with several provisions of the Constitution, which included Objectives 1(1), XIV (b) XX, XV and Articles 33(2) & (3), 20(1) & (2), 22(1) & (2), 24, 34(1), 44(a), 287, 8A and 45 of the Constitution.

The Petitioners prayed for the following declarations and orders from the Constitutional Court:

- 25 a) *That the acts and/or omissions of the respondent's agents (Ministry of Health and Health workers) stated in this petition are in contravention of and inconsistent with the petitioners' and women rights that are*

insured by the constitution in Articles 33(2) and (3), 20(1), and (2), 22(1) and (2), 24, 34(1), 44(a), 287, 8A & 45.

5 b) That it is a violation of the right to life guaranteed under Article 22 of the Constitution when death of expectant mothers results from non provision of the basic maternal health care packages in government hospitals.

10 c) That it is the violation of the right to health when health workers and the government fail to take the required health essential care during pre- and post-natal periods.

15 d) That the inadequate human resource for maternal health specifically midwives and doctors, frequent stock outs of essential drugs for maternal health and lack of emergency Obstetric Care (EmOC) services at Health Centres III, IV and hospitals is an infringement of the right to health under Objective XX, XIV(b), XV and Article 8A of the Constitution.

20 e) That the unacceptable higher maternal deaths in Uganda which are as a result of non provision of the basic minimum maternal health care and non attendance of the health workers to the expectant mothers are unconstitutional in as far as they are contrary to and against Articles 33(2) and (3), 20(1), and (2), 22(1) and (2), 24, 34(1), 44(a), and 8A
25 of the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda.

f) A declaration that the families of the mothers who have died due to negligence of the government health workers and the Government's

non provision of basic maternal health care package be compensated because of the rights violations.

- 5 g) *An order that the families of Sylvia Nalubowa and Jennifer Anguko who died in Mityana District and Arua Regional Referral Hospital respectively due to negligence of the Government health workers and the Government's non provision of the basic maternal health care package be compensated because of their rights violation.*
- 10 h) *Such other relief as this Honourable Court may deem fit.*

In its reply to the Petition, the Attorney General contended that the Petition was speculative and disclosed no question for Constitutional interpretation. Without prejudice to that assertion, the Attorney General further averred that
15 there were other competing interests and fundamental human rights which the Government had to be cater for, from the meagre resources at the State's disposal and that therefore, the few isolated acts and omissions which had been cited by the petitioners could not be used to dim the untiring efforts being made in the Health Sector to better for the well being of Ugandans.

20 At the commencement of the hearing of the Petition, Ms. Mutesi Patricia raised a preliminary objection on behalf of the respondent, against the Petition on the basis of the "political question doctrine." She contended that the way the petition was framed required the Constitutional Court to make a
25 judicial decision involving and affecting political questions and that in so doing the Court would in effect be interfering with political discretion which by law is a preserve of the Executive and the Legislature.

The Constitutional Court upheld the objection and accordingly struck out the Petition, without hearing the parties on its merits. Dissatisfied with that holding, the appellants appealed to this Court on the following grounds:

5 *1. The learned Justices of the Constitutional Court erred in law when they misapplied the Political Question Doctrine.*

2. The learned Justices of the Constitutional Court erred in law when they held that the Petition did not raise competent questions requiring their interpretation under Article 137 of the Constitution.

10 *3. The learned Justices of the Constitutional Court erred in law and misdirected themselves when they decided that the Petition called upon them to review and implement the health policies.*

15 The appellants prayed for the ruling of the Constitutional Court to be set aside and for an order directing that Constitutional Petition No. 16 of 2011 to be heard on its merits.

20 The appellants were represented in this Court by Counsel Peter Walubiri, Kizito Sekitoleko and Mr. David Kabanda. Ms. Patricia Muteesi, Principal State Attorney represented the respondent, the Attorney General. Counsel for both parties filed and relied on their written submissions.

Consideration of the Appeal

25 There are three grounds of appeal set out in the Memorandum of Appeal. I will tackle ground 2 first and then grounds 1 and 3 together.

Ground 2 of appeal was framed as follows:

“The learned Justices of the Constitutional Court erred in law when they held that the Petition did not raise competent questions requiring their interpretation under Article 137 of the Constitution.”

Submitting on this ground, counsel for the appellants faulted the learned
5 Justices of the Constitutional Court for their decision to strike out their
Petition on grounds that it did not raise competent questions requiring
interpretation under Article 137 of the Constitution.

They submitted that Article 137(1) vested powers of interpretation of the
entire Constitution in the Constitutional Court. Counsel further submitted
10 that all Acts of Parliament or other laws and things done under the authority
of any law and all acts and omissions by any person or authority, which
included acts and omissions of the executive relating to the rights under
Article 33 and 34 of the Constitution are justiciable before the Constitutional
Court.

15 Counsel also contended that the powers of interpretation of the Constitutional
Court were very wide and that no single article of the Constitution was ring-
fenced from interpretation since no act or omission of Government, if alleged
to be in contravention of the Constitution could be protected from scrutiny by
the Constitutional Court on any account.

20 Lastly, counsel for the appellants contended that the Petition raised issues
relating to omissions of the Government that contravened several provisions
of the Constitution. As a result, they submitted that the Constitutional Court
was obliged to entertain the Petition since it fell squarely within Article
137(3) of the Constitution. Counsel for the appellants relied on this Court's
25 decision in *Ismail Serugo v. Kampala City Council & Another, (Constitutional
Appeal No. 2 of 1998)*, among others, to support their contentions.

On the other hand, the Attorney General supported the decision of the Constitutional Court. The Attorney General contended that the learned Justices of the Constitutional Court correctly exercised their discretion when they refused to hear a case whose determination required the Court to encroach on the powers of other arms of Government. She contended that the learned Justices of Appeal acted judiciously with regard to all circumstances of the case since they noted that the petitioners could seek redress in the High Court by way of judicial review or through the enforcement of their rights in respect of the alleged acts and omissions.

- 10 The Attorney General also contended that this Court should not adopt a strict interpretation of Article 137 as obliging the Constitutional Court to determine any issue before it, regardless of whether the Petition called for Court to exercise powers of other arms of Government. In the Attorney General's view, allowing the Courts to exercise their jurisdiction by encroaching on the powers of other arms of Government would undermine the doctrine of separation of powers and consequently the rule of law leading to constitutional instability and anarchy.

- In rejoinder, counsel for the appellants contended that under Article 137(3), the Constitutional Court was not only authorized to hear Petitions falling therein but was obligated to resolve them. Counsel for appellants submitted that the doors of the Constitutional Court should remain wide open for people of Uganda to have access to the Court at all times to seek for declarations and redress under Article 137 of the Constitution, in the event of any violation. Counsel relied on *Uganda Association of Women Lawyers & 5 others v. Attorney General, (Constitutional Petition No. 2 of 2003)* in support of their assertion.

Having set out the parties' submissions, let me now revisit the holding of the Constitutional Court which gave rise to this ground. In striking out the appellant's Petition, the Constitutional Court observed and held as follows:

"This petition was brought to this Court under Article 137(3), (4) and Article 45 of the Constitution. The parameters within which this court is required to operate are established in Article 137(1) and (3) of the Constitution. It provides as follows:-

(a)

(b) any act or omission by any person or authority; is inconsistent with or in contravention of a provision of this Constitution may petition the Constitutional Court for a declaration to that effect, and for redress where appropriate."

This Court has jurisdiction on matters where the Petition, on the face of it shows that an interpretation of a provision of the constitution is required. See Ismail Serugo Vs Kampala City Council Attorney General Constitution Appeal NO. 2 of 1998

....

The Petitioners' contention is that the State has failed to provide basic indispensable health items in Government facilities for expectant mothers taking into consideration their unique status and their natural maternal function in the society. ... In the Petitioners' opinion, this is in violation of the National Objectives and Directive Principles of State policy Numbers 1 (i), XIV(b) XXVIII(b) and

Articles 33(2), (3), 20(1), (2), 22(1), (2), 24, 34(1), 44(a), 8(a) and 45 of the Constitution of Uganda.

...

5 *We are in agreement with the respondent's argument that the petition deals generally with all hospitals, health centres, and the entire health sector and broadly covers all expectant mothers. The Role of this Court as stated in Article 137 is to interpret the provisions of the Constitution. The petitioner must prove before*
10 *court that the constitutional provisions have been violated.*
 ... ”

With all the greatest respect to the learned Justices of the Constitutional Court, I disagree with their reasoning and the conclusions they reached.

- 15 The appellants in paragraph 5 of their Petition contended that non provision of basic indispensable health maternal commodities in Government health facilities and the imprudent and unethical behavior of health workers towards expectant mothers constituted acts and omissions which contravened and were inconsistent with the Constitution.
- 20 Furthermore, in paragraph 10 of their Petition, the appellants also set out the acts and omissions of Government and maternal health workers,, which they alleged were inconsistent with or in contravention of the Constitution. The alleged acts and omissions were spelt out in paragraph 10 (c), (g) (h), (i) (j), and (p) of the Petition, which I will only cite in the relevant parts as follows:
- 25 “10 (c) *“Non provision of basic maternal health commodities to expectant mothers and the failure on the part of health workers to exercise the requisite health care leads to death of children*

hence and infringement of their rights guaranteed under Articles 22, 33 and 34 of the Constitution.”

...

5 10(g) *When the government and its agents – the health workers neglect, refuse and or fail to take care of the expectant mothers, this non provision of the minimum health care package ... contrary to Article 33 and 34.*

10 10 (h) *The state has failed in its obligation to provide the basic health facilities and opportunities necessary to enhance the welfare of women to enable them realize their full potential and advancement which contravenes article 33(1) of the Constitution.*

15

10(i) *The expectant mothers are mal treated with lots of insults and harsh handling by the health workers in many of the government health centres all in contravention of Article 24 which guards against inhuman cruel and degrading treatment.*

20

10 (j) *The non provision of essential maternal kits, the non supervision of the public health facilities and the resultant omission and un professionalism of health workers contravenes Article 33(3)*

...

25

10(p) *The provision of basic minimum maternal health care to vulnerable poor women in government hospitals is of comparable priority under various regional and international instruments and of particular interest is article 12 of the ICESCR*

and comment 14 to which Uganda is a party and its failure contravenes objective XXVIII, Article 8A and 45 of the Constitution.

Apart from making allegations about the acts and/or omissions of the
5 Government and health care workers, as indicated above, the Petitioners also
cited the various provisions of the Constitution which they alleged the various
acts and/or omissions which they were complaining about were inconsistent
with or in contravention of. These included Articles 8A, 20(I) & (2), 22(I) &
(2), 24, 33(2) & (3), 34(I), 44(a), 287 and 45 of the Constitution. These
10 Articles were cited in paragraph 10 of the Petition.

It is clearly evident from the above pleadings that the appellants specified the
acts and omissions of the Government and its workers in the health sector
which they alleged were inconsistent with and in contravention of the
Constitution. The appellants also cited the particular provisions of the
15 Constitution which the said acts and omissions of respondent and its workers
were alleged to be contravening. The appellants also prayed in their Petition
to the Constitutional Court for specific declarations to the effect that those
acts and omissions contravened the Constitution and also for redress.

All these averments, in my view, gave rise to competent questions for the
20 Constitutional Court to hear, interpret and determine, with a view to
establishing whether the Petitioners' allegations had been proved to warrant
the Constitutional Court to issue the declarations sought by the Petitioners
and to either grant the Petitioners redress or to refer the matter to the High
Court with the appropriate directions, in accordance with the dictates of
25 Article 137(4).

It is therefore my finding that the Constitutional Court erred in striking out
the appellant's Petition partially on the ground that holding that there were

no competent questions set out in the Petition that required interpretation of the Constitution by the Court.

I would therefore allow ground 2 of appeal.

Grounds 1 & 3 of appeal

5 Ground 1 of appeal was framed as follows:

1. The learned Justices of the Constitutional Court erred in law when they misapplied the Political Question Doctrine.

On the other hand, ground 3 of appeal was framed as follows:

10 *3. The learned Justices of the Constitutional Court erred in law and misdirected themselves when they decided that the petition called upon them to review and implement the health policies.*

These grounds arise from the following holding of the Constitutional Court:

15 *“Much as it may be true that Government has not allocated enough resources to the health sector and in particular the maternal health care services, this court is, with guidance from the above discussions, reluctant to determine the questions raised in this petition. The Executive has the political and legal responsibility to determine, formulate and implement policies of Government, for inter-alia, the good governance of Uganda. This duty is a preserve of the Executive*
20 *and no person or body has the power to determine, formulate and implement these policies except in the Executive.*

This court has no power to determine or enforce its jurisdiction on matters that require analysis of the health sector government policies, make a review of some and let alone, their implementation. If this
25 *Court determines the issues raised in the petition, it will be substituting its discretion for that of the executive granted to it by law.*

In matters which require any court to draw an inference, like in the instant petition, an application for redress can best be entertained by the High Court under Article 50 of the Constitution. An

application for redress can only be made to the Constitutional Court in the context of a petition under Article 137 brought for the interpretation of the Constitution. See Ismail Serugo Vs Kampala City Council supra.

5 *From the foregoing, the issue raised by the petitioners concern the manner in which the Executive and the Legislature conduct public business/issues, affairs which is their discretion and not for this court. This court is bound to leave certain constitutional questions*
10 *of a political nature to the Executive and the Legislature to determine.*

We appreciate the concerns of the petitioners as regards what to them is the unsatisfactory provision of basic health maternal commodities and services towards expectant mothers that motivated them to lodge this petition. But with the greatest respect, we find the
15 *solution to the problem is not through a Constitutional petition that is in the nature of requiring this Court to resolve a political question like this one is. There are other legal alternatives that the Constitution and other laws provide for resolution of such.”*

The contention in the above two grounds is essentially the applicability of the
20 Political Question Doctrine in Uganda.

Counsel for the appellants contended that under the Constitution of Uganda, there was no room for application of the political question doctrine. Counsel submitted that the doctrine was based on the American Constitution construction which was not applicable in Uganda. Counsel criticized the
25 doctrine as being a relic from the past and contended that the case of *Marbury v. Madison 1 Cr. (1803)*, from which the doctrine was enunciated by the United States Supreme Court, was decided over two centuries ago and was a case on judicial review and not on Constitutional interpretation.

Counsel for the appellants further contended that the people of Uganda
30 enacted their own Constitution to suit their own circumstances and therefore cannot be held hostage to 19th century American jurisprudence. Counsel urged this Court to move under Article 132(4) of the Constitution and depart

from the case of *Attorney General v. Maj. Gen. David Tinyefuza*,
(*Constitutional Appeal No. 1 of 1997*) which ruling had given rise to the
proposition that the political question doctrine was applicable in Uganda.

The basis of departure, according to counsel, was that it was no longer good

- 5 law, but most significantly that it did not constitute part of the *ratio decidendi*
of the judgment of Court since it was not based on a specifically framed issue
of political question. According to counsel, it was only reflected in the
judgment of Kanyeihamba, JSC as a comment on principles of constitutional
interpretation.

- 10 Counsel further contended that the doctrine of separation of powers under
the United States of America Constitution was not the same in Uganda since
in the United States of America, Cabinet Secretaries cannot sit in the Senate,
whereas in Uganda, cabinet ministers can also be Members of Parliament. He
contended that Uganda was a constitutional democracy, where there was no
15 strict separation of powers. To this end counsel submitted that the political
question doctrine based on the American construction does not apply in
Uganda.

Counsel further submitted that the Constitution of Uganda was supreme and
had binding force on all authorities including the Executive. Relying on

- 20 Article 20 (2) of the Constitution, counsel for the appellants contended that
all organs and agencies of Government had an obligation to respect, uphold
and promote the rights and freedoms enshrined in Chapter 4 of the
Constitution of Uganda and that these rights included those that were in issue
in this appeal. Counsel for the appellants contended that therefore, no act or
25 omission of Government, if alleged to be in contravention of the Constitution
could be protected from scrutiny by the Constitutional Court, on account of
the antiquated political question doctrine.

On the contrary, counsel submitted that Courts in Uganda, in interpreting the Constitution were required to be guided by national interest and common good enshrined in the National Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy as provided for under article 8A of the Constitution. These principles, 5 counsel for the appellants submitted, included the obligation of the Government of Uganda to ensure that all Ugandans (including women) enjoyed rights and opportunities and access to, among others, health services. Accordingly, counsel for the appellants submitted, this obligation on the part of the Government left no room for the operation of the political question 10 doctrine in Uganda.

Without prejudice to the above submissions, counsel for the appellants further contended that the political question doctrine was not applicable where rights of an individual and the constitutionality of a law or an act or omission were in issue. Counsel cited authorities where Courts in different 15 jurisdictions entertained matters that were political in nature on grounds that the rights of an individual were in jeopardy.

Counsel for the appellants cited and relied on the American case of *Zivotofsky v. Clinton, Sec of State*. 132 S. Ct. 1421 (2012), where the Supreme Court of the United States of America allowed citizens born in 20 Jerusalem to have “Israel” listed as the place of birth on their passports, in spite of the State Department’s arguments to the contrary that were based on the long standing policy of not taking a position on the political status of Jerusalem.

Counsel for the appellants also cited in support of their submissions the 25 Canadian case of *Bertrand v. AG of Quebec* [1992] 2 LRC 408, where the Supreme Court of Quebec, Canada, held that if a citizen claims that his

fundamental rights are threatened by Government action, the Courts must decide whether there has been a violation of the said rights.

5 Lastly, counsel for the appellants contended that the Petition alleged contravention of several provisions of the Constitution, some dealing with fundamental rights and freedoms. Counsel for the appellants therefore contended that the Constitutional Court erred in law when it ruled that the political question doctrine prevailed over the Constitutional Court's duty to interpret the Constitution. Counsel for the appellants urged this Court to so find and to allow the appeal and reinstate the Petition for hearing on its
10 merits by the Constitutional Court.

Attorney General's submissions on grounds 1 & 3 of Appeal

Counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, supported the decision of the Constitutional Court to strike out the appellants' petition on grounds of the political question doctrine.

15 Counsel argued that the Petition required the Constitutional Court in the course of exercising its interpretation jurisdiction, to exercise power/discretion which was reserved by law to Parliament and the Executive. This, according to respondent's counsel, contravened the doctrine of separation of powers which was reflected in the political question doctrine.

20 For emphasis, counsel contended that the appellants' petition required the Constitutional Court to review the general performance of the maternal health sector. This review, according to counsel, would be a breach of Article 90(1) of the Constitution, as well as Rules 133 and 161 of the Parliamentary Rules of Procedure which operationalized Article 90, which give the
25 Parliament of Uganda an oversight responsibility over the implementation of government policies and programmes.

Counsel further submitted that the appellants' petition also required the Constitutional Court to review the propriety of government macro-economic policy of resource allocation to the maternal sector *vis a vis* other sectors, contrary to the provisions of Article 111(2) of the Constitution of Uganda, as well as section 7(2) of the Budget Act.

It was also counsel for the respondent's contention that the political question doctrine was not concerned with jurisdiction under Article 137 but with "justiciability". Counsel submitted that Court's jurisdiction under Article 137 was never disputed but that what was disputed was whether the matters that were raised in the Petition were justiciable. According to counsel for the respondent, justiciability, unlike jurisdiction, was a matter for the discretion of the Court. Thus a court of competent jurisdiction could exercise its inherent discretion and decline to hear a matter which was properly before it, if it determined that the issue was best suited for resolution by other arms of government, or that its determination would involve an undue encroachment on the power of parliament or the Executive. Counsel for the respondent contended that since the doctrine entailed the use of discretionary power, it should be exercised judicially with regard to the circumstances of the case. Counsel cited *AG v. Paul K Ssemogerere & Z. Olum, Constitutional Appeal No. 3 of 2004* in support of the respondent's submissions.

Counsel for the respondent further submitted that when Courts exercise their jurisdiction to check the excesses of other branches of the government or their departments, they should not do so by encroaching on the powers of the executive or parliament. Counsel for the respondent cited an example of Judicial Review, where the High Court, could review the decision making process but that it would not substitute exercise of discretion or make a decision which was legally reserved to another arm of government.

In conclusion, counsel for the respondent urged this Court to uphold the political question doctrine as being applicable in Uganda, and to hold that the doctrine is consistent with our Constitution, laws and jurisprudence.

5 In rejoinder, counsel for the appellants contended that the appellants' Petition to the Constitutional Court concerned a demand for a declaration regarding government obligations with respect to Uganda's preventable healthcare crisis. Counsel further contended that by applying an erroneous understanding of the political question doctrine, the Constitutional Court failed to address the central question presented by the appellants, that is:
10 *"whether the persistent denial of labour and delivery care to expectant mothers violated the appellants' constitutional rights"*.

Counsel for the appellants also contended that several jurisdictions strongly disfavoured the political question doctrine. In support of their contention, they cited, *inter alia* *Zivotofsky v. Clinton, Sec of State. (supra)*; *Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign, 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC)*; *Paschim Banga Khet Mazdoor Sanity v. State of West Bengal, (1996) 4 S.C.C 37*; and
15 *Government of Rep. of South Africa v. Grootboom, 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC)*.

Counsel contended that where government action or omission violates the Constitution which is the fundamental law, the Courts as guardians of the
20 Constitution could intervene and make declarations even on matters that would ordinarily be of policy in nature.

Lastly, counsel also contended that the executive had no untouchable prerogative to allocate resources and make policy decisions or omissions in clear breach of the Constitution. Counsel then reiterated their prayers in the
25 Memorandum of Appeal.

Having set out the parties' submissions let me now revisit the holding of the Constitutional Court which gave rise to this ground. In striking out the appellant's Petition, the Constitutional Court observed and held as follows:

5 *"Political question doctrine" holds that certain issues should not be decided by courts because their resolution is committed to another branch of government and /or because those issues are not capable, for one reason or another, of judicial resolution. Its purpose is to distinguish the role of the judiciary from those of the Legislature and the Executive, preventing the former from encroaching on either of the*
10 *latter. Under this rule, courts may choose to dismiss the cases even if they have jurisdiction over them.*

...

15 *The Constitution has clearly streamlined the roles of each of the organs of Government. I.e. the Legislature, the Executive and the Judiciary as follows:*

Article 79 Functions of Parliament

...

Article 111. The Cabinet

...

20 *Article 126 Exercise of judicial power*

...

These articles clearly stipulate the different roles assigned to each of the three organs of Government by the Constitution.

25 *According to Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Ed. Butterworths, London, 1989, Para 5, the doctrine of separation of powers implies that;*

1. *A particular class of function ought to be confided only to the corresponding organ of Government.*
2. *The personnel of the three organs of Government must be distinct.*
- 30 3. *The autonomy of each branch of government must be immune from undue encroachment from any of the others."*

Resolution of Grounds 1 and 3 of Appeal

It is important at the onset to examine the meaning of the political question doctrine and whether it is applicable in Uganda. According to Black's Law Dictionary, 9th Edition at page 1277, the political question doctrine is defined
5 as follows:

“A Judicial principle that a Court should refuse to decide an issue involving the exercise of discretionary power by the executive or legislative branch of government.”

A political question, on the other hand is defined, on the same page as
10 follows:

“A question that Court will not consider because it involves the exercise of discretionary power by the executive or legislative branch of government-Also termed as non justiciable question.”

The origins of the political question doctrine can be traced back to the
15 Supreme Court of the United States in the case of **Marbury v. Madison** 5 U.S. (1 Cr.) 137 (1803), where the Court held that the province of the court was solely to decide on the rights of individuals and not to inquire how the Executive, or Executive officers perform duties in which they had discretion and secondly, that questions, which are by their nature political, or which
20 are, by the constitution and laws, submitted to the executive can never be made in this court.

It has also been observed that while it was neither created by legislation nor is it a part of the United States of America's Constitution, this rule appears to emanate from the doctrine of Separation of Powers. It has hence been
25 described as a judicial doctrine created by the Court as part of the broader concept of justiciability—the issue of whether a matter is appropriate for court (or judicial?) review. The Political Question doctrine rule is therefore both interpretive and self-imposed by the courts.

In **Coleman v. Miller**, 307 U.S. 433, 454-455, the United States Supreme Court further observed that the dominant considerations in determining whether a question falls within the political question category are the appropriateness under the system of government of attributing finality to the action of the political departments and also the lack of satisfactory criteria for a judicial determination.

However, even in the United States where the political question doctrine is said to have originated from, the Supreme Court has not always reached similar outcomes wherever the doctrine is invoked. For example, in **Baker v. Carr** 369 U.S. 186 (1962) Mr. Justice Brennan, who wrote the opinion of the Court, held as follows:

“Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due to coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.”

Mr. Justice Brennan continued,

“Unless one of these formulations is inextricable from the case at bar, there should be no dismissal for non justiciability on the ground of a political question's presence. The doctrine of which we treat is one of “political questions,” not one of “political cases.” The courts cannot

reject as "no law suit" a bona fide controversy as to whether some action denominated "political" exceeds constitutional authority."

In the *Baker Case (supra)*, the Court rejected the political question argument and went on to hold that the political question did not bar Courts from
5 reaching the merits of a challenge brought against Tennessee's system of apportioning its state legislature. The Court held that although the case was "political" in the sense that it was about politics, and there were questions about how Courts might grant relief if Tennessee's apportionment scheme was declared unconstitutional, the Court saw neither as reasons for
10 invocation of the political question doctrine.

The question that then arises is whether the political question doctrine is applicable in Uganda, and if so, whether it bars the Constitutional Court from entertaining questions raised in the appellants' Petition.

15 The Constitution prescribes the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court in Article 137 (1) as follows:

"Any question as to the interpretation of this Constitution shall be determined by the Court of Appeal sitting as the Constitutional Court."

Justice Mulenga, JSC (as he then was) in *Paul Semogerere & 2 ors v. the Attorney General, Constitutional Appeal No. 1 of 2002*, while commenting
20 about the mandate of the Constitutional Court under Article 137(1) observed as follows:

*"The court is thus unreservedly vested with jurisdiction to determine any question as to the interpretation of any provision of the Constitution. With regard to interpretation of the Constitution, the
25 court's jurisdiction is unlimited and unfettered. This is reiterated in clause (5), which provides for reference of "any question as to the*

interpretation of this Constitution", arising in any proceedings in a court of law, to the Constitutional Court "for decision in accordance with clause (1)".

Under the Constitution of Uganda, when a person claims that *"anything in or done under the authority of any law"* or any action or inaction on the part of *"any person or authority"*, is inconsistent with or in contravention of the Constitution, the Constitutional Court is the appropriate court to determine whether the person's claim has substance or not. Therefore, the Constitutional Court cannot abdicate this duty by declining to entertain a Petition filed under Article 137 of the Constitution on grounds that the matter will be infringing on the discretionary powers of another organ of the State.

Let me now turn to examine the issue whether the political question doctrine applies to bar the Constitutional Court from looking into the acts and/or omissions on the part of those vested with executive powers.

Article 111(2) provides as follows:

"The functions of the Cabinet shall be to determine, formulate and implement the policy of the government and to perform such other functions as may be conferred by this Constitution or any other law."

While this Article vests the power to determine, formulate and implement government policies in the Cabinet, Article 137(3)(b) of the Constitution grants any citizen who alleges that any act or omission by any person or authority is inconsistent with and in contravention of a provision of this Constitution, may petition the Constitutional Court for a declaration to that effect and for redress where appropriate. This Article provides in the relevant part as follows:

"A person who alleges that –

(a) ...; or

(b) any act or omission by any person or authority,

is inconsistent with or in contravention of a provision of this Constitution, may petition the constitutional court for a declaration to that effect and for redress where appropriate.”

The ruling of the Constitutional Court on the application of the political question doctrine acting as a bar on the Constitutional Court to look into the acts and/or omissions of the Executive complained of by the Petitioners cannot be upheld.

As I have already discussed above, Article 137(3)(b) of the Constitution of Uganda gives a right to any person who alleges that any act or omission by any person or authority, is inconsistent with, or in contravention of, any provision of the Constitution, to access the Constitutional Court directly by filing a Petition to challenge such acts or omissions. Once this is done, the Constitutional Court has a duty to entertain it and may, after hearing the parties, grant the declaration that such an act or omission is inconsistent with or contravenes the provision(s) in question.

Let me now turn to highlight the constitutional provisions relied on by the Attorney General in relation to the role of Parliament.

Article 79 of the Constitution of Uganda provides for the functions of Parliament. Article 90(1) of the Constitution further provides for Parliament to “appoint committees necessary for the efficient discharge of its functions.” It should however be noted that although Article 79, among others, vests Parliament with the power to make laws, this does not mean that these laws are impervious to scrutiny from court. This is because under Article 137(3) of the Constitution, the same Constitution also vests any person with power to challenge the constitutionality of any law that he or she believes contravenes or is inconsistent with the Constitution. The same Article also vests the Constitutional Court with power to hear and make determination on Petitions filed against any Act passed by Parliament under Article 79 which is allegedly

inconsistent with or in contravention of any provision of the Constitution.
Thus, in my view, Article 79 is not absolute. It is subject to the Constitution.

Clearly, the above provisions read together, do not warrant the exclusion of the Constitutional Court from looking into matters reserved for Parliament on the basis of the political question doctrine. Therefore, the arguments of the Attorney General that the Constitutional Court cannot inquire into matters reserved for Parliament is not supported by the clear provisions of Article 137(1) and (3) (a) of the Constitution.

Turning to this appeal, it is important to note that the role of Parliament was never an issue in this Petition. The petitioners (now appellants) did not allege that any acts or omissions on the part of Parliament, to prompt the Constitutional Court to rule on the applicability of the political question doctrine determine this issue. Rather, the appellants were challenging the actions and omissions of the executive and its agents. Since the issue of the political question doctrine vis-a-vis functions of Parliament was never raised by the Petition, it therefore follows that this part of the holding of the Constitutional Court cannot stand and should be set aside. This is because the Court ruled on an issue that was neither raised in the Petition nor canvassed during the parties' respective submissions on the preliminary objection.

Given my finding above, I would, therefore hold that the political question doctrine has limited application in Uganda's current Constitutional order and only extends to shield both the Executive arm of Government as well Parliament from judicial scrutiny where either institution is properly exercising its mandate, duly vested in it by the Constitution. It goes without saying that even in these circumstances, factual disputes will always come up where a private citizen challenges either the Executive or Parliament action or inaction and the resultant outcome of such actions and inaction in respect

to either institution's implementation of its respective constitutional mandate and whether such action or inaction contravenes or is inconsistent with any provision of the Constitution. It is my considered view that it was for this very purpose that the Constitutional Court was established and given powers under Article 137(1) and (3) to consider these allegations and determine them one way or another.

Indeed, the Constitutional Court has had no problem in the past in dealing with such kinds of problems before. For instance in *Paul K. Semogerere & Anor. v. AG, [Constitutional Petition No. 5 of 1999]*, the Constitutional Court did not have any problem with striking out the Referendum and Other Provisions Act, 1999 on ground that the Act had been passed by Parliament without the requisite quorum stipulated in the Constitution.

Recently, in *Oloka-Onyango & 9 others v. AG, [Constitutional Petition No. 08 of 2014]*, the Constitutional Court once again struck out the Anti-Homosexuality Act 2014 on ground that it was passed by Parliament while it lacked the requisite quorum required.

Was the Constitutional Court correct and justified to strike out the appellants' petition without hearing its merits?

In refusing to hear the petition on its merits, the Constitutional Court held as follows:

"This court, while executing its duties, is bound to follow the principles of Constitutional interpretation laid out in Paul Kawanga Ssemwogerere & 2 others Vs Attorney General constitutional Appeal NO. 1 of 2001 (SC). The constitutional provisions must not be read and considered in isolation but as a whole so as to complement each other.

...

5 *It would appear to us that the petitioners to this petition have available remedies that they can pursue in the law we have pointed out, other than resorting to this petition, which calls upon us to resolve what we have appreciated to be a political question.*

Further, we are also of the view that the petitioners who aver that they are being aggrieved by the respondent can apply for redress under Article 50 of the Constitution.

10 *Accordingly, we do not find any competent questions set out in the petition that require interpretation of Constitution by this court. The acts and omissions complained of fall under the doctrine of "political question".*

Article 20(2) of the Constitution provides as follows:

15 *"The rights and freedoms of the individual and group enshrined in this Chapter shall be respected, upheld and promoted by all organs and agencies of Government and by all persons."*

Clearly this article does not exclude any institution, be it the Executive or Parliament from respecting, upholding and promoting the rights and freedoms enshrined under Chapter 4 of the Constitution. It therefore follows
20 that where the Court is being called upon to look into whether certain laws, actions or omissions of Parliament are in contravention of Article 20(2) and/or any other provision of the Constitution, it would not be right for the Court to decline to consider the merits of the allegations made in the Petition, before it would be able to pronounce itself on the allegations made in the
25 Petition filed under Article 137(3) of the Constitution.

Secondly, Article 137(3) permits Petitions to be based on allegations that the acts and omissions are inconsistent with the Constitution. Such a Petition can therefore be presented before the Constitutional Court, and should be entertained by the Constitutional Court irrespective of whether or not it would be upheld by the Constitutional Court after hearing it on its merits, provided the Petition discloses a cause of action as was defined by this Court in *Serugo v AG (supra)*.

In this particular case under consideration, the Constitutional Court was being called upon to inquire into the alleged acts and omissions of the Executive with respect to the delivery of maternal health services in the country and to make declarations if it was satisfied on the evidence before it that the allegations had been proven. The Constitutional Court was also requested to give redress if it found it appropriate or to refer the matter to the High Court to investigate and determine the appropriate redress.

All these matters were properly within the ambit of the powers vested in the Constitutional Court by Article 137 of the Constitution. Article 137 vests the Constitutional Court with the power and the responsibility to hear petitions lodged under it and to consider and determine whether there is any merit in the alleged violations of the Constitution as stated in the petition. In my view, the jurisdiction vested in the Constitutional Court is not discretionary, but mandatory. Hence, the Constitutional Court cannot abdicate its duty to hear a Petition properly lodged before it on its merits and to make a determination whether or not to grant the declarations sought, as well as the redress, where appropriate.

Furthermore, it is my view that the Constitutional Court not only has the jurisdiction, but also the responsibility to construe such provisions, with a

view to determining whether the acts or omissions complained of are inconsistent with or contravenes the provision(s) in question.

Therefore, the fear that the Constitutional Court will transgress into areas reserved to the other arms of government was not warranted. The primary
5 role of the Constitutional Court is to interpret the Constitution, and make declaration(s) where it finds that certain laws, acts or omissions are either inconsistent with or in contravention of some provisions of the Constitution. Inevitably, the Constitutional Court will, in the process of adjudicating these matters before it, evaluate both sides of the argument in order to reach a just
10 decision.

My reasoning is fortified by the opinion of Justice Mulenga, JSC (as he then was) in *Paul Semogerere & 2 ors v. the Attorney General, Constitutional Appeal No. 1 of 2002* where while considering the role of the Constitutional
15 Court, he held as follows:

*“Even where it is not possible to harmonize the provisions brought before it, the court has the responsibility to construe them and pronounce itself on them, albeit to hold in the end that they are inconsistent with each other. Through the execution of that
20 responsibility, rather than shunning it, the court is able to guide the appropriate authorities, on the need, if any, to cause harmonization through amendment. In my opinion therefore, the decision that the Constitutional Court has no jurisdiction to construe or interpret any provision of the Constitution is misconceived and erroneous in law.”*

25 I am further fortified in my reasoning by the following additional considerations. First, if this Court were to uphold the respondent’s contentions to the effect that the political question in Uganda ousted the Constitutional Court’s jurisdiction to inquire into the acts and omissions that

the appellants had alleged were inconsistent with or in contravention of the Constitution, all the acts and omission of the Executive will be beyond judicial scrutiny. The Constitutional Court may end up dealing with only constitutional violations of private actors. Such a result would run contrary to the clear language of the Constitution which clearly entrenched provisions intended to ensure that all the arms of the State and everyone, irrespective of whether he or she is acting in their official or private capacity, respects and upholds the Constitution.

Such a result would also run contrary to the letter and spirit of the Constitution which recognizes the doctrine of separation of powers of the three arms of government, while at the same time building in a system of checks and balances between the Executive, the Legislature and the Judiciary.

Secondly, going by Black's Law Dictionary definition of a political question as "a question that Court will not consider because it involves the exercise of discretionary power by the executive or the legislative branch of government", it would be very difficult if not impossible for either the respondent to successfully argue that the questions/matters that were raised by the appellant's Petition to the Constitutional Court indeed raised a political question or several political questions.

It should be recalled that the appellant's Petition alleged, among others, omission to stock drugs and supplies, neglect of duty by the government's medical personnel, and inhumane treatment of expectant mothers. The Petitioners contended that these acts and omissions had resulted in an unacceptably high maternal mortality rate in the country. Could it be argued that it was part of Government policy to achieve the alleged actions and omissions! It should be noted that the Attorney General did not plead in defence of the Executive that the acts that the appellants complained of by its

health workers were in furtherance of the Government of Uganda policy of the delivery of Maternal Health Services in Uganda. Therefore, in as much as it is an undisputable fact that the constitutional mandate of the Executive covers the determination, formulation, and implementation of the maternal health policies in Uganda, there is no way the acts and omissions complained of by the appellants can be brought under the ambit of the Executive's mandate, to shield it from judicial inquiry.

The only allegation in the appellants' Petition that could be argued could possibly come under the political question doctrine was the allegation that failure to stock the necessary drugs was a result of inadequate budgetary allocation to the maternal health sector. But even with such an allegation in the Petition and even if the Constitutional Court believed that it may be raising a political question, I am still of the view that the Constitutional Court should have heard the parties and made a determination based on the merits or demerits of the Petitioner's claim and not struck out the Petition summarily without hearing them.

I therefore find that although the political question doctrine has some limited application in Uganda, in this particular case, the Constitutional Court erred in law when it abdicated its constitutional duty to hear the merits of the appellants' Petition before reaching the decision whether to allow or dismiss it on the political question doctrine.

I now wish to address myself to the Constitutional Court's reasoning that the Petitioners should have gone to the High Court. This, in my view, is a self defeating argument. If indeed the political question doctrine precluded the Constitutional Court from questioning government's actions or inaction, how then could the High Court exercise its powers under Article 50 or Section 33 of the Judicature Act or under the Government Proceedings Act, without being confronted with the political question issue in a similar manner?

As I have already observed, the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court under Article 137 is not exclusive to just interpretation. (*Attorney General v. David Tinyefuza, (supra)*).

- 5 Other than making a declaration sought under Article 137(3), the Court may grant an order for redress under Article 137(4), if it considers that there is need to do so or refer the matter to the High court to investigate and determine the appropriate redress.
- 10 A petitioner cannot therefore be faulted for seeking redress under his or her Petition filed under Article 137(3). This is especially so, where the petitioner has in the petition sought for both a declaration and redress. Seeking redress does not make a Petition bad in law.

If the Constitutional Court felt that it could not grant any redress, it should
15 have dealt with the part of the petition seeking a declaration/interpretation and referred the matter of redress to the High Court. This is because the Constitutional Court has a legal and mandatory duty to adjudicate on any matter dealing with the interpretation of the Constitution.

- 20 It is not a requirement under the Constitution that in order for a person to seek redress, the Petitioner must have suffered a personal legal grievance. The petitioner, in my view, need not show that he or she has experienced or is experiencing or is under the threat of experiencing harm based on the challenged law, act or omission. The grievance extends beyond a petitioner
25 directly aggrieved by any act or omission to petition Court. On the other hand, seeking redress in the High Court presupposes that the petitioner suffered a grievance.


I would therefore find that although the political question doctrine has limited application in Uganda, the Constitutional Court erred in law when it struck out the appellants' Petition without hearing it on its merits on grounds that they had no jurisdiction and that the Petition raised political questions. I would therefore allow ground 1 and 3 of appeal.

Conclusion

In conclusion, I would allow the appeal and make the following Orders:

- a) The Constitutional Court is directed to proceed and hear Constitutional Petition No. 16 of 2011 on its merits.
- b) Given that it is not the fault of either party that the appellants' petition was not heard on its merits, coupled with the need for this country to develop its constitutional jurisprudence in the areas covered by the Petition, I would not make any order as to costs. Each party will therefore bear their respective costs.

Dated at Kampala this 30th day of October 2015.


.....

HON. DR. ESTHER KISAAKYE

JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT

THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UGANDA
AT KAMPALA

(Coram: Katureebe, CJ, Tumwesigye, Dr. E. Kisaakye , JJSC; Dr. Odoki, Tsekooko, Okello, & Kitumba, Ag. JJSC)

CONSTITUTIONAL APPEAL NO. 01 OF 2013

Between

- 1) CENTRE FOR HEALTH, HUMAN RIGHTS
& DEVELOPMENT**
- 2) PROF. BEN TWINOMUGISHA**
- 3) RHODA KUKIRIZA**
- 4) INZIKU VALENTE**

.....APPELLANTS

AND

ATTORNEY GENERAL.....RESPONDENT

[Appeal from the ruling of the Constitutional Court (Mpagi-Bahigeine, DCJ, Byamugisha, Kavuma, Nshimye & Kasule, JJA) at Kampala dated 5th June 2012 in Constitutional Petition No. 16 of 2011]

JUDGMENT OF G.M. OKELLO, AG. JSC

I have had the benefit of reading in draft the judgment of my learned sister, Justice Dr. E. Kisaakye, JSC; and I agree with her that the Constitutional Court should have heard the Petition and

decided it on the merit one way or the other on the evidence available.

The Petition clearly alleges that certain acts and omissions of the Government and its workers in the health sectors are inconsistent with or in contravention of some named provisions of the Constitution. These allegations raise questions of Constitutional interpretation which fall within the jurisdiction conferred on the Constitutional Court by Clause I of Article 137 of the Constitution. See **Ismail Serugo Vs KCC & A.G; SCCA NO. 2 of 1998.**

I also agree with the orders she proposed.

Dated at Kampala this 30th day of October 2015.



.....

G.M. OKELLO

AG. JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT

**THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UGANDA
AT KAMPALA**

{Coram: Katureebe, C.J., Tumwesigye, & Dr. Kisaakye, JJSC.; Dr. Odoki, Tsekooko, Okello & Kitumba, Ag. JJSC.}.

Constitutional Appeal No. 01 of 2013.

1. CENTRE FOR HEALTH HUMAN RIGHTS & DEVELOPMENT.
2. PROF. BEN TWINOMUGISHA
3. RHODA KUKIRIZA
4. INZIKU VALENTE

Between

===== APPELLANTS.

Versus

ATTORNEY GENERAL

===== RESPONDENT.

{ Appeal from the ruling of the Constitutional Court at Kampala (Mpigi-Bhugine, DCJ/ JCC, Byamugisha, Kavuma, Nshimye and Kasule, JJCC / JJSC.) dated 05th June, 2012 in Constitutional Petition No. 16 of 2011. }

Judgment of J.W.N. Tsekooko, Ag. JSC. :-

This Constitutional Appeal is against the ruling of the Constitutional Court.

The Constitutional Court upheld an objection by the Attorney General about the competence of the petition instituted by the present appellants namely Centre for Health, Human Rights and Development, (1st Appellant), Prof. Ben. Twinomugisha, (2nd Appellant), Rhoda Kukiriza (3rd Appellant) and Inziku Valente (4th Appellant). The Constitutional Court struck out the petition essentially because of its views that the issues raised are political questions. The four Appellants were dissatisfied with the decision and so they have now appealed to this Court.

I have had the benefit of reading in draft the judgment prepared by her Lordship the Hon. Lady Justice Dr. E. Kisaakye, JSC. I agree with her conclusions that the appeal be allowed and that the Constitutional Court
5 should hear and determine the petition. I have also perused the well reasoned concurring judgment of the learned Chief Justice. I agree with his analysis. I agree with both their Lordships that each party should bear their own costs.

10 Delivered at **Kampala**, this 30th day of October, **2015**.


J.W.N. Tsekooko,
Ag. Justice of the Supreme Court.

THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UGANDA
AT KAMPALA

(CORAM: KATUREEBE, C.J., TUMWESIGYE, KISAACKY, JJ.SC, ODOKI, TSEKOOKO,
OKELLO, KITUMBA, AG. JJ.SC)

CONSTITUTIONAL APPEAL NO: 02 OF 2014

BETWEEN

1. CENTRE FOR HEALTH,
HUMAN RIGHTS AND
DEVELOPMENT (CEHURD)
2. PROF. BEN TWINOMUGISHA
3. RHODA KUKIRIZA
4. INZIKU VELENTE

..... APPELLANTS

AND

ATTORNEY GENERAL RESPONDENT

[Appeal from the judgment of the Constitutional Court at Kampala (Mpigi-Bahigeine, D.C.J, Byamugisha, Kavuma, Nshimye and Kasule, JJCC) dated 05th June, 2012 in Constitutional Petition No. 16 of 2011]

JUDGMENT OF TUMWESIGYE, JSC

I have had the benefit of reading in draft the judgments of Hon. Justice Dr. Esther Kisaakye and the Chief Justice, Bart Katureebe, and I agree with them that this matter should go back to the Constitutional Court for that court to consider the petition on the merits.

I would therefore, allow the appeal.

I agree that each party should bear its costs in this court and in the court below.

Dated at Kampala this 30th day of October 2015


Jotham Tumwesigye
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT

THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UGANDA
AT KAMPALA

CORAM: KATUREEBE CJ, TUMWESIGYE, KISAAKYE, JJ.S.C, ODOKI, TSEKOOKO,
OKELLO, AND KITUMBA, AG. JJ.S.C.

CONSTITUTIONAL APPEAL NO.01 OF 2013

BETWEEN

1. CENTRE FOR HEALTH, HUMAN RIGHTS & DEVELOPMENT 2. PROF BEN TWINOMUGISHA 3. RHODA KUKIRIZA 4. INZIKU VALENTE	}	:APPELLANTS
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AND

ATTORNEY GENERAL :RESPONDENT

[Appeal from the ruling of the Constitutional Court (Mpagi Bahigeine, DCJ, Byamugisha, Kavuma, Nshimye and Kasule JJ.A) at Kampala dated 5th June 2012 in Constitutional Appeal No.16 of 2011]

JUDGMENT OF KITUMBA, AG. JSC

I have had the benefit of reading in draft the lead judgment prepared by my learned sister Kisaakye JSC.

I agree with her reasoning and conclusion. The petition should be returned to the Constitutional Court for hearing and determination on merit and each party should bear its own costs.

I would, however, like to add for emphasis that the supremacy of the constitution is clearly provided for in Article 2 of the Constitution and that it has binding force on all authorities and persons throughout Uganda.

Article 137 of the Constitution gives the Constitutional Court the mandate to deal with all questions of constitutional interpretation. Sub article 3 there provides:

(3) *A person who alleges that-*

- (a) *an Act of Parliament or any other law or anything in or done under the authority of any law; or*
- (b) *any act or omission by any person or authority, is inconsistent with or in contravention of a provision of this Constitution may petition the constitutional court for a declaration to that effect, and for redress where appropriate.*

This article has been interpreted to mean that when the petitioner alleges anything done by anybody or authority or any omission to be inconsistent with or in contravention of the provisions of the Constitution, the Constitutional Court has the jurisdiction to hear and determine the petition. See *Ismail Serugo versus Kampala City Council & Attorney General (Supreme Court Constitutional Appeal No 2 of 1998)*.

In the instant appeal the petitioners alleged certain acts and omission of the government regarding the provision of maternal health services to be inconsistent with and in contravention of the constitution and quoted the allegedly contravened articles of the constitution. The petition which contained such pleadings was clearly within the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court. The court had to hear and determine the petition depending on the evidence provided.

The Constitutional Court declined to hear the petition because of the political question doctrine.

I am of the considered view that whatever is done in Uganda by anybody or authority if it does not conform to the provisions of the constitution it can be challenged in the Constitutional Court. Hence the Constitutional Court has rightly looked into the proceedings of Parliament and declared as null and void Acts of Parliament which were passed without the required

quorum as required by law. See *Paul Semwogerere and Another Vs Attorney General Const Petition No.5 of 1999*.

The same is applicable to policy decisions made by the cabinet. In case such decisions are inconsistent with or in contravention of the Constitution they can be challenged in the Constitutional Court.

Dated at Kampala, this ^{30th} day of ^{October} 2015.

C.N.B. Kitumba
C.N.B. KITUMBA

AG. JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT

quorum as required by law. See *Paul Semwogerere and Another Vs Attorney General Const Petition No.5 of 1999*.

The same is applicable to policy decisions made by the cabinet. In case such decisions are inconsistent with or in contravention of the Constitution they can be challenged in the Constitutional Court.

Dated at Kampala, this 20th day of October 2015.

C.N.B. Kitumba
C.N.B. KITUMBA

AG. JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT