As of August 2023, with a total of 220, the African continent is regarded as the region that has experienced the highest number of military coups, hereafter, referred to as coups.[1] In fact, The Economist speculates that the continent will continue to witness an increase in the number of coups.[2] Since 2020, two specific regions of Africa that are almost considered as the ‘epicentre’ of coups are the Sahel and West regions. Exacerbated by corruption, authoritarian rule, entrenched social injustices, and fragile economies, the situation in some states has compelled the military to overthrow presidents and seize power. This has been the case in Guinea, Mali and Gabon where presidents have clung to power for too long, stifling the progress of democratic governance. However, a troubling pattern emerged in the aftermath of coups, as military leaders are often reluctant to relinquish power and organise democratic elections that would allow citizens to choose their representatives.
Guinea under Colonel Doumbouya’s rule
Guinea is not only known for its rich mineral sources, but also for its long history of coups. In 2010, Condé became president during Guinea’s first democratic presidential election. However, his term as president was not as democratic as was expected by the country. Condé was accused of failing to address basic socio-economic rights, and for eroding democratic norms. After the 2015 elections in which Condé was re-elected for another term, he held a referendum on a new constitution in 2019 that would extend his presidential term limit. That allowed him to run for a third term in 2020. However, Condé’s shift toward autocracy sparked demonstrations from both civilians and the military. Consequently, in September 2021, the military took power in a coup during which military leader, Colonel Mamady Doumbouya became the President of Guinea. It is important to note that the rule of Colonel Doumbouya as president is only temporary, serving for the transitional period. This is because the transitional government had promised to hold elections within a little over two years, starting from 2022. However, the elections initially scheduled for January 2025 were later cancelled. As the civilians of Guinea await the date for the next elections, Doumbouya is doing no better than his predecessor, Condé, in terms of restoring the country’s democracy. In fact, it has been reported that many opposition figures have been detained, and press freedom is shrinking.
Are Democratic Elections Ever Held in a ‘Coup within a Coup’ State? The Case of Mali
The 1991 coup in Mali was an outcry not only by the military but also by the civilians, against increased economic hardship. The people characterised Traoré’s regime as corrupt.
Traoré, who himself led a coup in 1968 and ruled Mali from November 1968 to March 1991, ended up becoming a dictator who consolidated a regime wracked with corruption, human rights abuses, poor governance, but also deep-rooted economic challenges. Under Traoré’s regime, the structural adjustment programme (SAP) of the International Monetary Fund was concluded. The SAP in itself aimed at addressing fiscal deficit, which was the case in Mali at the beginning of its inception. Yet, one important element to highlight in the Malian context is that SAP tried to improve environment of private enterprises, while ignoring the development of the informal sector, a sector on which the Malian economy mainly relied.[3] Consequently, this led to the collapse of the informal sector, leading the economy in a dire state. This led to a proliferation of riots by anti-government civilians, trade unions, and students in the streets of Bamako. Few days later, the riots were followed by a group of military officers under Lieutenant-Colonel Amadou Toumani Touré taking control of the country, and arresting Traoré. One year after the coup, a draft constitution was approved by referendum, leading to successful presidential, legislative and municipal elections in 1992 itself. The new president, Konaré, steered the country towards a pluralist democracy, restoring civil liberties and economic liberation. However, since 1991, Mali has witnessed two more coups, in 2012 and 2020 respectively, indicating that the democratic project of the country remains a fragile one.
In fact, the 2020 coup in Mali occurred during the third wave of coups. The 2020 first coup in Mali was a manifestation against widespread corruption and deteriorating security situation. This prompted Colonel Assimi Goita, dethroning Ibrahim Boubacar Keita, and nominating the former defence minister, Colonel Bah Ndaw to take over leadership of the country. However, this was extremely short-lived due to a second coup in May 2021 led by the same military leader who orchestrated the first one. Goita ousted Ndaw following disagreements over a cabinet reshuffle that resulted in the removal of two military officers. Since then, Goita has been acting as the President of Mali, and has failed to hold the presidential elections that were scheduled for February 2024.
Nguema, the Cousin of Ali Bongo: Can He Bring Democracy in Gabon?
The most recent coup in Africa is the one that happened in Gabon in August 2023 when the Gabonese military officers seized power from President Ali Bongo who had been in power since 2009. In the case of Gabon, poor democratic development was further compounded by the Bongo dynasty’s prolonged grip on power and self-enrichment. Omar Bongo rose to power in 1967, after the death of President Leon Mba. It is believed that Omar Bongo was appointed vice president on the advice of Jacques Foccart. Foccart was known for orchestrating clandestine military coups in Francophone Africa and held significant influence within the framework of Françafrique. Omar Bongo served as President from 1967 until his death in 2009, holding office for 42 years. Shortly after, his son Ali Bongo assumed office following the 2009 elections. This 55-year rule by the Bongo dynasty not only entrenched a dynastic system in Gabon, but also fostered a regime marked by corruption, lack of transparency and poor socio-economic development.
Since, Ali Bongo ruled the country until the 2023 coup during which he was overthrown by Brice Clotaire Oligui Nguema. Currently, Gabon is now being ruled by a transitional government under the leadership of General Brice Oligui Nguema. A significant development during this transition, which has become a focal point of debates, is the new constitution approved by 92% of Gabonese voters. One positive aspect of the new constitution is the introduction of presidential term limits. In contrast to the previous constitution, which did not include provisions for presidential term limits, the draft constitution introduces a seven-year term, renewable once, replacing the former five-year term.[4] This promise is significant, as the constitutional clause on term limits also serves to prevent dynastic rule.
As Gabon prepares for its first presidential elections since the unconstitutional transfer of power in August 2023, it is perhaps too early to decide whether the coup in Gabon and the new constitution that now limits the presidential term will be beneficial to the people of Gabon. As shown above in the previous case studies, coups in Africa do not often guarantee a smooth transitioning to democracy. In the case of Gabon, the April elections will likely occur as a means of legitimising Nguema’s role as the new Gabonese President.
Conclusion
In the three aforementioned cases, we observed that coups failed to achieve their intended objectives of consolidating democracy, revitalising the economy in the interest of the people, and addressing corruption. Ironically, in coup-prone African countries, coup leaders often become presidents, only to be removed by the military in yet another coup. Or coups could be interpreted as a means for military leaders to legitimise their presidency.
Funding acknowledgement
Funding for this research was provided by SOAS, University of London under the ISPF-ODA Programme, for the project, 'Coups d'état and the potentials for reconstruction and renewal in Africa ’ led by Dr L Enonchong.